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IMPEACHMENT METHODS ILLUSTRATED: MOVIES, 
NOVELS, AND HIGH PROFILE CASES 
 Martin A. Schwartz
*
 & John Nicodemo
**
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
PROSECUTION FOR MURDER: PEOPLE V. ARMSTRONG 
MENARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE, ILLINOIS (1858) 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION’S EYE WITNESS 
CHARLES ALLEN: 
 
Question: Did you actually see the fight? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And you stood near them? 
Answer: No, it was a hundred and fifty feet or more. 
Question: In the open field? 
Answer: No, in the timber. 
 
* Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. B.B.A., cum laude, 1966, City College of New York; 
J.D., magna cum laude, 1968, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1973, New York University 
School of Law.  Professor Schwartz has authored leading treatises including Section 1983 
Litigation: Claims and Defenses (4th ed. 2004-2006), Section 1983 Litigation: Federal Evi- 
dence (4th ed. 2007) and Section 1983 Litigation: Jury Instructions (2007).  He is co-author 
of Section 1983 Litigation: Statutory Attorney’s Fees (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2011).  Professor 
Schwartz is also the author of a bi-monthly column for the New York Law Journal entitled 
“Public Interest Law.”  He is lead author of Section 1983 Litigation, Second Edition (Federal 
Judicial Center 2008).  He chairs the Practising Law Institute‟s annual program on Section 
1983 litigation and Trial Evidence and co-chairs its annual Supreme Court Review program.  
This Article is based on a presentation given at the Practising Law Institute‟s Trial Evidence 
Symposium held in New York, New York.  The author expresses appreciation for the valua-
ble assistance of the editors of the Touro Law Review, especially Issue Editor Katharine 
O‟Dette and Editor-in-Chief Ara Ayvazian in the preparation of this Article. 
** John Nicodemo earned his Juris Doctor from Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law 
Center in December 2011.  He served on the Touro Law Review editorial board as Articles 
Editor.  Working on this Article with the esteemed Martin A. Schwartz has been both an 
honor and a pleasure. 
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Question: What kind of timber? 
Answer: Beech. 
Question: Leaves on it rather thick in August? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: What time did all this occur? 
Answer: Eleven o‟clock at night. 
Question: Did you have a candle? 
Answer: No, what would I want a candle for? 
Question: How could you see from [the] distance of a hun-
dred and fifty feet or more without a candle at eleven o‟clock 
at night? 
Answer: The moon was shining real bright. 
Question: A full moon? 
Answer: Yes, a full moon.1 
Question: Does the almanac not say that on August twenty-
ninth (the night of the murder), the moon had disappeared, the 
moon was barely past the first quarter instead of being full? 
[No Answer] 
Question: Does the almanac also say that the moon had dis-
appeared by eleven o‟clock? 
[No answer] 
Question: Is it not a fact that it was too dark to see anything 
from fifty feet, let alone one hundred and fifty feet? 
[No Answer]2 
 
Irving Younger,3 the legendary Evidence professor, provided 
 
1 At this point, the cross-examiner asked the judge to take judicial notice of an 
astronomical table contained in an almanac.  “[A] court may judicially notice a fact that is 
not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court‟s 
territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”  FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 
2 Irving Younger, The Art of Cross Examination, 1 SEC. LIT. MONOGRAPH SERIES 1, 29-30 
(1976) (additional commentary by Irving Younger omitted). 
3 “Irving Younger [was] a leading scholar on trial techniques. . . .  In his 30-year career, 
Mr. Younger was a Federal prosecutor, judge, professor, trial lawyer and author.  Thousands 
of law students have seen or heard him in some of the more than 10,000 video and audio 
tapes he made on evidence, trial practice and civil procedure.”  Stephen Labaton, Irving 
Younger, Lawyer, 55, Dies; Judge, Law Professor, and Author, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1988, 
2
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the above example of a cross-examiner‟s attempt to impeach the cre-
dibility of a witness during cross-examination.  The attorney 
representing the defendant conducting the cross-examination was Ab-
raham Lincoln.4  Younger‟s example illustrates the goal of impeach-
ment—to discredit a witness‟s testimony, or, in other words, con-
vince the jury that the witness‟s testimony on direct is not worth 
believing.  The outcome of many cases may turn on a witness‟s cre-
dibility.  If an attorney‟s cross-examination successfully impeaches a 
witness by demonstrating to the jury that the witness‟s testimony is 
not believable, the attorney may have successfully negated key oppo-
nent testimony.  Jurors, of course, are not likely to place much re-
liance, if any, on testimony coming from the mouths of witnesses 
with suspect credibility. 
This article will review and illustrate the various methods of 
impeachment authorized by the law of evidence.  The methods fall 
under seven categories: (1) physical or mental disability relating to an 
attribute to be a competent witness, (2) bias, (3) convictions, (4) bad 
or immoral acts, (5) bad character for truth and veracity, (6) prior in-
consistent statements, and (7) specific contradiction.5  This article fo-
cuses on the Federal Rules of Evidence, although, in many instances, 
state rules of impeachment, with some exceptions and variations, are 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/15/obituaries/irving-younger-lawyer-55-dies-judge-law-
professor-and-author.html.  
4  JOHN EVANGELIST WALSH, MOONLIGHT: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE ALMANAC TRIAL 
33 (2000).  Legend has it that the so-called “blue” almanac was a counterfeit designed by 
Lincoln for the purpose of impeaching the witness.  WALSH, supra, at 33. 
5 Not all of the several impeachment methods are covered in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.  Impeachment by attacking the credibility of a witness by introducing reputation or 
opinion evidence relating to a witness‟s truth and veracity and immoral acts is covered by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 608 (Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness); Federal 
Rule of Evidence 609 (Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime) allows the intro-
duction of evidence of a witness‟s conviction in prescribed circumstances to attack his or her 
character; Federal Rule of Evidence 613 (Prior Statements of Witnesses) allows a cross-
examiner to introduce evidence of a witness‟s prior statement which is inconsistent with his 
or her in-court statement in an effort to discredit his or her believability.  The Federal Rules 
do not expressly codify impeachment by showing a witness‟s disability (e.g., poor eyesight, 
hearing difficulties, and mental incapacity), bias, or specific contradiction, but these are 
well-established impeachment methods and authorized by federal law.  E.g., United States v. 
Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (stating that “It is sufficient that the defendant has the op-
portunity to bring out such matters as the witness’ bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his 
poor eyesight, and even . . . the very fact that he has a bad memory.”); United States v. Abel, 
469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984) (regarding bias); Behler v. Hanlon, 199 F.R.D. 553, 558 (D. Md. 
2001) (stating that “evidence that impeaches by contradiction . . . can be both substantively 
admissible[, as well as admissible] for its impeachment value”). 
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consistent with the federal impeachment rules.6  The impeachment 
methods are illustrated with references to movies, novels, and high-
profile trials. 
II. WHO MAY IMPEACH? 
The novel, Judge and Jury,7 by James Patterson and Andrew 
Gross, provides a colorful application of Federal Rule of Evidence 
607, which allows “[a]ny party including the party that called the 
witness,” to “attack the witness‟s credibility.”8  In Judge and Jury, a 
government witness, Mr. Machia, is on the stand facing direct exami-
nation by the prosecuting attorney.9  The direct examination begins 
with the prosecutor‟s attempt to reveal the witness‟s rather extensive 
criminal past, including a laundry list of felonies, with Mr. Machia 
acknowledging that he has been breaking the law “since [he] learned 
to use a fork.”10 
In the poignant 1992 film, Philadelphia,11 the plaintiff, And-
rew Beckett (played by Tom Hanks), a former successful trial attor-
ney, sues his former law firm under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.12  The plaintiff claims he was fired from the firm because he has 
AIDS, and he chose to call his former employer to the stand.13  The 
plaintiff‟s attorney, played by Denzel Washington, attempts to im-
 
6 Compare, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (“[F]or a crime that, in the convicting jurisdic-
tion, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence: (A) 
must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in which the wit-
ness is not a defendant; and (B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a 
defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that de-
fendant[.]”), with OHIO R. EVID 609(a)(2) (“[N]otwithstanding Evid. R. 403(A), but subject 
to Evid. R. 403(B), evidence that the accused has been convicted of a crime is admissible if 
the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year pursuant to the law 
under which the accused was convicted and if the court determines that the probative value 
of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of 
misleading the jury.”), and IND. R. EVID. 609(a) (“For the purpose of attacking the credibili-
ty of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime or an attempt of a 
crime shall be admitted but only if the crime committed or attempted is (1) murder, treason, 
rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, arson, criminal confinement or perjury; or (2) a crime 
involving dishonesty or false statement.”). 
7 JAMES PATTERSON & ANDREW GROSS, JUDGE AND JURY ( 2006). 
8 FED. R. EVID. 607. 
9 PATTERSON & GROSS, supra note 7, at 58. 
10 Id. at 58-59. 
11 PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1993). 
12 Id.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006). 
13 PHILADELPHIA, supra note 11. 
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peach his own witness, one of Beckett‟s former clients, by showing 
that the client, who testified on direct that Beckett‟s work was merely 
satisfactory, had testified at an earlier deposition that he was “im-
pressed, and delighted” with Beckett‟s work.14  The plaintiff‟s attor-
ney argued, “[F]ive months ago this witness characterized Andrew 
Beckett as caviar.  Now he‟s [calling him] a bologna sandwich.”15 
Why might the proponent want to impeach his own witness?  
Suppose, as in Judge and Jury, a party is faced with having to call a 
witness whose testimony is essential, but whose past misdeeds sub-
jects his credibility to an impeachment attack.  The direct examiner 
may attempt to mitigate “the sting” of a cross-examiner‟s attack on 
the witness‟s credibility by exposing the witness‟s shortcomings on 
direct.16  The jury then learns of the witness‟s “baggage,” and the di-
rect examiner can proceed with the testimony that may be useful to 
his or her case.17  It is not a perfect solution for the proponent, but 
perhaps less damaging than having the negative baggage brought out 
for the first time on cross-examination.  Also, in some cases, a direct 
examiner, upon realizing that his or her witness appears uncoopera-
tive, recalcitrant, evasive, or hostile, may impeach the witness in an 
 
14 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1): 
A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness‟s Prior Statement.  The declarant testifies and is 
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant‟s testimony and was giv-
en under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceed-
ing or in a deposition;  
(B) is consistent with the declarant‟s testimony and is offered 
to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recent-
ly fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or 
motive in so testifying; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived ear-
lier. 
Id. 
15 PHILADELPHIA, supra note 11. 
16 See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee‟s note. 
The amendment to Rule 609(a) makes two changes in the rule.  The first 
change removes from the rule the limitation that the conviction may only 
be elicited during cross-examination, a limitation that virtually every cir-
cuit has found to be inapplicable.  It is common for witnesses to reveal 
on direct examination their convictions to “remove the sting” of the im-
peachment. 
Id. 
17 Id. 
5
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effort to discredit the witness‟s unexpected negative testimony.18 
In Philadelphia, the plaintiff‟s attorney impeached the witness 
by introducing the witness‟s prior inconsistent statement.19  Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) provides that if a statement “is inconsistent with the 
declarant‟s testimony and was given under penalty of perjury at a tri-
al, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition,” the inconsistent 
statement is exempt from the rule against hearsay and thus admissible 
both to impeach and to prove the truth of the matter the inconsistent 
statement asserts.20  Because Beckett‟s attorney impeached his wit-
ness by reiterating his testimony from an earlier deposition, under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, this inconsistent statement is exempt from 
the rule against hearsay.  In these circumstances, the trial judge 
would not give the jury a limiting instruction that the inconsistent 
statement may be considered only for the purpose of evaluating the 
witness‟s credibility.  The judge may, but is not required, explain to 
the jury that the inconsistent statement may be considered both for its 
truth and in evaluating the witness‟s credibility. 
Rule 607 lies in direct opposition to the English common law 
rule,21 which forbade a party from impeaching his or her own wit-
ness.22  The common law rule flowed from the notion that a party 
who calls a witness vouches for the credibility of that witness.  Fur-
ther, by forbidding the impeachment of one‟s own witness, a party 
may be deterred from calling unreliable witnesses.23  However, the 
common law rule, in some instances, operated to dissuade a party 
from calling a necessary witness because of the witness‟s questiona-
ble credibility.24  Therefore, because parties sometimes have a press-
 
18 FED. R. EVID. 607 (A direct witness‟s hostility, or lack of cooperation, may be countered 
with leading questions, which are allowed under FED. R. EVID. 611(c)).  
19 See PHILADELPHIA, supra note 11. 
20 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
21 See FED. R. EVID. 607 advisory committee‟s note (“The traditional rule against 
impeaching one‟s own witness is abandoned as based on false premises.  A party does not 
hold out his witnesses as worthy of belief, since he rarely has a free choice in selecting them.  
Denial of the right leaves the party at the mercy of the witness and the adversary.”). 
22 See RICHARD O. LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS, JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JOHN H. BLUME, 
SPEPHAN LANDSMAN, & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 396 (West 
Group, eds., 4d ed. 2011) (“[A] party presenting a witness may „impeach‟ any unfavorable 
aspect of the witness‟s testimony, even if the bulk of the testimony is friendly.”). 
23 Id. at 395. 
24 Id.  The Lempert book rejects the notion that unethical attorneys armed with the ability 
to impeach their own witnesses would somehow use this rule to coerce their own witnesses 
to “secure falsely favorable testimony” by threatening to expose unsavory information about 
6
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ing need to impeach their own witnesses on direct examination, the 
common law in time was modified to allow an exception permitting 
direct examiners to impeach their own witnesses if they could show 
surprise or prejudice from the testimony given by the witness.  The 
Federal Rules effectively dispense with the need to demonstrate sur-
prise or prejudice.  Although a party may, under Rule 607, impeach 
his or her own witness by offering the witness‟s prior inconsistent 
statement, most federal courts have not allowed this to occur if the 
proponent called the witness in order to introduce the inconsistent 
statement to evade the rule against hearsay.25 
III. THE SEVEN METHODS OF IMPEACHMENT 
The evaluation of a witness‟s credibility is solely a question 
for the trier of fact.26  Courts, therefore, do not allow experts to give 
an opinion about the credibility of another witness.  Nor are lay wit-
nesses ordinarily allowed to opine about the believability of another 
witness‟s credibility.  But the law does authorize plentiful methods 
for attacking a witness‟s credibility.  We have grouped these methods 
into seven categories.   
The question arises whether the impeaching party is limited to 
questioning the witness and accepting the witness‟s answer, or 
whether the impeaching party may seek to contradict the witness‟s 
testimony with other evidence, i.e., extrinsic evidence. 
The answer depends on whether the particular method of im-
peachment is considered as either non-collateral or collateral.27  The 
 
them; nothing prevents these unethical attorneys from making the same threats outside of 
court.  Id. at 395.  The authors state that the rule simply prevents ethical attorneys from 
presenting a proper case.  Id. 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing 
that the proponent may not impeach his or her own witness with prior inconsistent 
statements if the purpose is to obviate the rule against hearsay). 
26 See FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 15:01 (5th ed. 2011) (“You, as jurors, are the sole and 
exclusive judges of the credibility of each of the witnesses called to testify in this case and 
only you determine the importance or the weight, if any, that their testimony deserves.  After 
making your assessment concerning the credibility of a witness, you may decide to believe 
all of that witness‟ testimony, only a portion of it, or none of it.”). 
27 See Emily Stern, IMPEACHMENT BY WAY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE § 40:6 (Robert L. 
Haig, ed., 3rd ed. 2010) (“As to collateral matters (those matters not related to issues in the 
case, but related only to the witness‟s credibility), the examining attorney is bound by the 
witness‟s answers and cannot attempt to disprove those answers through extrinsic 
evidence.”). 
7
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“non-collateral” methods are considered the more important im-
peachment methods; for convenience, one may refer to them as the 
“vital” methods.  When cross-examiners choose to employ a vital 
method of impeachment, they are not limited to simply questioning 
the witness on cross-examination.  The cross-examiner may seek to 
contradict the witness‟s testimony by introducing extrinsic evi-
dence—that is, any type of evidence other than the in-court testimony 
of the witness being impeached, e.g., documents, photographs, or a 
second witness in his or her attempt to discredit the witness.28  For 
example, if a witness denies on cross-examination that he was bribed 
to testify in the case, the cross-examiner may be permitted to intro-
duce the testimony of a second witness, a document, or an audio tape 
to demonstrate the bribe.  However, the right to introduce extrinsic 
evidence is not unlimited and is still subject to Federal Rule 403. 
Collateral methods of impeachment, on the other hand, while 
authorized under the laws of evidence, are less vital that non-
collateral methods.  Unlike the vital methods, collateral methods al-
low a cross-examiner to impeach only by questioning the witness on 
cross-examination.  In other words, extrinsic evidence may not be in-
troduced to contradict the witness‟s answer. 
The only means of impeachment that the Federal Rules expli-
citly state as inadmissible relates to a witness‟s religious beliefs.29  
Evidence of a witness‟s religious beliefs or opinions is inadmissible 
for the purpose of demonstrating that his or her credibility is affected 
by the nature of those beliefs.30  However, “an inquiry for the purpose 
of showing interest or bias because of [religious beliefs or opinions] 
is not within the prohibition.”31  For example, a witness‟s affiliation 
with a church that is a party to the action may be admissible to show 
the witness‟s bias. 
 
28 See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (extrinsic evidence admissible to 
impeach by showing bias). 
29 FED. R. EVID. 610; see United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“The purpose of the rule is to guard against prejudice which may result from disclosure of a 
witness‟s faith.  The scope of prohibition includes unconventional or unusual religions.”). 
30 FED. R. EVID. 610 (“Evidence of a witness‟s religious beliefs or opinions is not 
admissible to attack or support the witness‟s credibility.”). 
31 FED. R. EVID. 610 advisory committee‟s note. 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss1/5
2012 IMPEACHMENT METHODS ILLUSTRATED 63 
 
A. The Vital Methods of Impeachment 
1. Impeachment by Disability: A Witness’ 
Perception, Memory, Ability to Communicate, 
and Obligation to Give Truthful Testimony 
Under Oath 
The 1992 Academy Award-winning comedy, My Cousin  
Vinny,32 pointedly illustrates the use of impeachment by showing a 
witness‟s disability.  In the movie, two defendants are charged with 
robbery and the murder of a convenience store clerk.  In a memorable 
courtroom scene, Defense Attorney Vincent Gambini (played by Joe 
Pesci) cross-examines an elderly prosecution eyewitness who, on di-
rect, identified the defendants as the perpetrators of the crime.  Gam-
bini then asked the witness to put on her eyeglasses, a pair of super-
thick lensed spectacles, which suggest extreme near-sightedness.  Af-
ter Gambini established that on the day of the crime the witness wore 
those glasses, he asked the witness to tell the court the number of fin-
gers he is holding up; she answered “four,” when he actually dis-
played only two.  The comedic moment arrives when the witness, af-
ter having sworn that her current prescription allowed her to see 
perfectly, acknowledged that she may need thicker glasses. 
The classic scene demonstrates impeachment by disability.  
Under the law of evidence, a cross-examiner may impeach a witness 
by disability by demonstrating that a witness is deficient in one or 
more of the four traditional categories of characteristics required to 
be considered a competent witness: (1) perception; (2) memory; (3) 
communication; or (4) the ability to understand the obligation re-
quired to give truthful testimony.33  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
expressly require every witness to affirm under oath or affirmation 
that her testimony is truthful and based on personal knowledge.34  
 
32 MY COUSIN VINNY (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1992). 
33 FED. R. EVID. 603; LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 22, at 440-45. 
34 See FED. R. EVID. 602. 
        A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced suf-
ficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of 
the matter.  Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the 
witness‟s own testimony.  This rule does not apply to a witness‟s expert 
testimony under Rule 703. 
Id. 
9
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The rules, however, do not set forth express rules regarding im-
peachment by disability.  Regardless, impeachment by disability is a 
well-established impeachment method used in federal and state courts 
to show, for example, a witness‟s mental disabilities, drug dependen-
cy, alcoholism, and recollection deficiencies.35 
Impeachment by disability is a vital method of impeachment, 
allowing an examining attorney to introduce extrinsic evidence to 
impeach her witness, subject to Rule 403.36  An excellent example of 
a cross-examiner‟s use of extrinsic evidence to effectively impeach a 
witness by disability occurred in United States v. Accetturo,37 which 
is the subject of Robert Rudolph‟s “The Boys from New Jersey: How 
the Mob Beat the Feds.”38  In Accetturo, the defendants were charged 
with a laundry list of federal crimes.39  The prosecution called its 
purported “star witness,” Joseph Alonzo, a life-long friend of the de-
fendants, to testify that he had personally known the defendants and 
can attest to their murderous venture.40  During cross-examination, 
the defense, in an attempt to show that Alonzo was insane, introduced 
“psychiatric records showing that [Alonzo] had once been diagnosed 
as „schizophrenic‟ and had been given electroshock treatments on at 
 
35 See, e.g., Sampol, 636 F.2d at 667 (finding that it was proper to impeach a witness by 
showing the witness‟s drug influence at the time of the event or while testifying); Roberts v. 
Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that the plaintiff‟s drug use was 
relevant to his ability to recall specific incidents in question); Brandon v. Village of 
Maywood, 179 F. Supp. 2d 847, 853 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (stating that the plaintiff‟s consumption 
of alcohol on the day he was shot by a police officer “may be relevant to his memory and 
perception of events”). 
36 FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.”). 
37 623 F. Supp. 746 (D.N.J. 1985). 
38 ROBERT RUDOLPH, THE BOYS FROM NEW JERSEY: HOW THE MOB BEAT THE FEDS 
(Rutgers Univ. Press 2009). 
39 Accetturo, 623 F. Supp. at 748-49 (charging “conducting a racketeering enterprise in 
violation of 18 [U.S.C. §] 1962(c), which included conspiracy to distribute and possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana in violation of 18 [U.S.C. §] 2 and 21 [U.S.C. 
§] 841; conduct of an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 [U.S.C. §] 1955; mail 
fraud in violation of 18 [U.S.C. §§] 1341 and 2; wire fraud in violation of 18 [U.S.C. §§] 
1343 and 2; Hobbs Act extortion in violation of 18 [U.S.C. §§] 1951 and 2; extortionate cre-
dit transactions in violation of 18 [U.S.C. §§] 892-894 and 2; and extortion in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5.”). 
40 ROBERT RUDOLPH, THE BOYS FROM NEW JERSEY: HOW THE MOB BEAT THE FEDS 151 
(Rutgers Univ. Press 2009). 
10
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least six occasions.”41  The psychiatrist‟s records constitute an exam-
ple of extrinsic evidence used to impeach by showing disability.  As a 
result, Alonzo “was forced to admit that he lied to the psychologist 
who examined him for the government.”42 
The much-publicized criminal prosecution against three New 
York City detectives for the shooting of Sean Bell provided a text-
book example of the introduction of extrinsic evidence to impeach a 
witness‟s credibility by disability.43  After the prosecution introduced 
the testimony of Trent Benefield, a passenger in Bell‟s car who pur-
portedly witnessed the alleged murder, the defense, on cross-
examination, attempted to impeach his credibility by introducing evi-
dence indicating that he may have been intoxicated or incoherent as a 
result of drug use at the time of the shooting.44  The defense showed 
Mr. Benefield his medical reports from the hospital from the morning 
of the shooting in which Benefield admitted to drinking beer and 
smoking marijuana each day for the previous six years; Benefield 
claimed to have had no recollection of reporting his alcohol and drug 
habits to the treating physicians.45  Again, introduction of the medical 
reports illustrate extrinsic evidence introduced to impeach by show-
ing the witness‟s disability. 
2. Bias, Motive, and Interest 
Very few cases in recent memory have received the notoriety 
and the overwhelming public interest as the 1994 California double 
murder prosecution against former National Football League star O.J. 
Simpson.  During the trial, Police Detective Mark Fuhrman testified 
 
41 Id. at 151-52, 198. 
42 Id. at 198. 
43 See Sean Bell, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
people/b/sean_bell/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated Dec. 1, 2011) (“In the early 
morning hours of Nov. 25, 2006, Sean Bell, a 23-year-old New York City man due to be 
married later that day, walked out of a Queens strip club, climbed into a gray Nissan Altima 
with two friends who had been celebrating with him—and died in a hail of 50 bullets fired 
by a group of five police officers.”). 
44 Michael Wilson, Passenger in Sean Bell’s Car Recounts Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/nyregion/01bell.html?scp=1&sq=passenger% 
20in%20sean%20bell%20car%20recounts&st=cse (attempting to discredit Mr. Benefield‟s 
eyewitness testimony of the incident, the defense also introduced evidence that Mr. 
Benefield accepted $10,000 from Al Sharpton‟s National Action Network, possibly creating 
a presumptive financial interest in the case‟s outcome.). 
45 Id. 
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for the prosecution that he found a key piece of evidence near Simp-
son‟s residence that linked him to the murders of his former wife and 
her friend, specifically the famous “bloody glove” found at the mur-
der scene.46  The defense, attempting to discredit Fuhrman‟s testimo-
ny, cross-examined him about his racial biases and use of the term 
“nigger,” both of which he denied.  The defense was allowed to in-
troduce audiotapes, i.e., extrinsic evidence, of statements in which 
Fuhrman used the term “nigger” several times in a conversation with 
Laura Hart McKinney.47 
The defense‟s attempt to impeach the credibility of Detective 
Fuhrman by showing his racial bias illustrated effective use of extrin-
sic evidence of bias.  Although bias is not codified within the Federal 
Rule of Evidence, the Supreme Court has held that this time-honored 
method of impeachment remains available under the Federal Rules.48  
Because bias is a vital method of impeachment, extrinsic evidence 
may be used to discredit witness testimony (subject to Rule 403).49  
In Simpson‟s case, Furman‟s bias was established by the audiotape 
on which he was heard using the term “nigger.” 
In the federal perjury prosecution against former professional 
baseball superstar Barry Bonds, in which he was accused of lying un-
der oath about his steroid use, his defense attorneys sought to discre-
dit the prosecution‟s witnesses by showing their biases.50  During the 
cross-examinations of the two witnesses, Bonds‟ former girlfriend, 
Kimberly Bell, and Bonds‟ childhood friend-turned-business asso-
ciate, Steve Hoskins, the defense introduced evidence that both Bell 
and Hoskins not only had personal reasons to testify against Bonds, 
but also “benefitted” from the government by agreeing to testify 
 
46 GERALD F. UELMEN, THE O.J. FILES: EVIDENTIARY ISSUES IN A TACTICAL CONTEXT 170 
(1997). 
47 Id. at 169-170. 
48 See Abel, 469 U.S. at 51 (stating that “it is permissible to impeach a witness by showing 
his bias under the Federal Rules of Evidence just as it was permissible to do so before their 
adoption”). 
49 Id.; 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6095 (2d 
ed. 2011) (“Bias usually can be shown through extrinsic evidence.  Thus, if a witness does 
not admit to the facts establishing bias those facts may be proved with other evidence.”). 
50 Laird Harrison, Evidence Against Bonds from Enemies, Defense Says, REUTERS, Apr. 7. 
2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/08/us-barrybonds-trial-
idUSTRE73668L20110408 (noting that Bonds‟ perjury charge arose from his alleged lying 
to officials regarding his use of prohibited performance enhancing drugs while playing 
professional baseball). 
12
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against him.51  First, the witnesses acrimoniously ended their rela-
tionships with Bonds, calling into question their highly personal mo-
tives.52  Additionally, the defense uncovered factual information re-
garding the government‟s leniency of the two witnesses regarding 
charges against them (Bell for extortion and Hoskins for embezzle-
ment).53  Essentially, each had an interest in testifying against Bonds 
that called into question the veracity of their testimony.  The de-
fense‟s introduction of the information regarding the government‟s 
“leniency” deals presented another example of the use of extrinsic 
evidence for the purpose of impeachment by bias. 
3. Impeachment by Conviction: Can a Jury 
Trust a Witness who has a Record of 
Conviction? 
Many classic Hollywood films offer dramatic illustrations of 
impeachment by conviction.  One well-known example is the 1959 
motion picture courtroom drama, Anatomy of a Murder.54  This vital 
method of impeachment is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 
609.55  In an unforgettable scene, the noir courtroom drama depicts a 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959).  In the film, Lieutenant Manion is 
on trial for killing a man whom he believed raped his wife.  Id.  The excerpted scene here 
portrays testimony at trial from “snitch” Mr. Miller, Manion‟s cellmate.  Id. 
55 FED. R. EVID. 609 states. 
(a) In General.  The following rules apply to attacking a witness‟s cha-
racter for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction: 
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by 
death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence: 
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in 
a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant; and 
(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is 
a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to that defendant; and 
(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be 
admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements 
of the crime required proving—or the witness‟s admitting—a dishonest 
act or false statement. 
(b) Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years.  This subdivision (b) 
applies if more than 10 years have passed since the witness‟s conviction 
or release from confinement for it, whichever is later.  Evidence of the 
conviction is admissible only if: 
13
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highly charged cross-examination of a key government witness.  The 
defendant, Lieutenant Manion was accused of killing a man whom he 
believed raped his wife.  At trial, Mr. Miller, Manion‟s cellmate and 
government “snitch,” testified for the prosecution on direct regarding 
Manion‟s reputation for brutal violence by offering several state-
ments he claims Manion made to him.  On cross, the defense, much 
to Miller‟s and the prosecutor‟s chagrin, produced a history of Mil-
ler‟s violent criminal past.  After a deft and highly dramatic wearing 
down of the witness‟s credibility, the defense attorney, played by 
James Stewart, ends the cross stating, “Your Honor, I don‟t think I 
can dignify this-creature-with anymore questions.”56 
Federal Rule 609 is fairly detailed, and the best way to under-
stand its provisions is to follow the category of conviction prescribed 
in the rule.  Let us start with subdivision (a)(2) of Rule 609, which 
pertains to convictions involving an element of deceit or false state-
ment—that is, “if the court can readily determine that establishing the 
elements of the crime required proving—or the witness‟s admitting—
 
(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and 
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the 
intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use. 
(c) Effect of a Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. 
Evidence of a conviction is not admissible if: 
(1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certifi-
cate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
that the person has been rehabilitated, and the person has not been con-
victed of a later crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more 
than one year; or 
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile Adjudications.  Evidence of a juvenile adjudication is ad-
missible under this rule only if: 
(1) it is offered in a criminal case; 
(2) the adjudication was of a witness other than the defendant; 
(3) an adult‟s conviction for that offense would be admissible to attack 
the adult‟s credibility; and 
(4) admitting the evidence is necessary to fairly determine guilt or inno-
cence. 
(e) Pendency of an Appeal.  A conviction that satisfies this rule is ad-
missible even if an appeal is pending.  Evidence of the pendency is also 
admissible. 
56 See ANATOMY OF A MURDER, supra, note 54. 
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a dishonest act or false statement.”57  Congress intended this specific 
category to be relatively narrow,58 because the rule requires the cross-
examiner to “have ready proof that the conviction required . . . an act 
of dishonesty or false statement.”59  These “crimen falsi” convictions 
may be used to impeach any witness in both civil and criminal cases, 
regardless of whether the conviction was a misdemeanor or a felo-
ny.60  Further, these convictions are not subject to Federal Rule of 
Evidence Rule 403—that is, an attorney employing impeachment by 
one of these convictions need not be concerned that the evidence will 
be excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the risk of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading 
the jury.”61  Because of the convictions‟ high probative value on the 
 
57 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2007) (exemplifying the 
narrowness of the precepts of Rule 609(a)(2) by stating that issuing “ „worthless checks 
could conceivably involve forgery, false pretenses . . . or [could be as] innocuous as a check 
returned for insufficient funds,‟ ” underscoring the fact-specific nature of Rule 609(a)(2) 
(quoting United States v. Cunningham, 638 F.2d 696, 699 (4th Cir. 1981))); Medrano v. Los 
Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1507 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 940 (1993) (holding 
that drug use and shoplifting are not considered crimes that involve dishonesty or false 
statement); United States v. Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United 
States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 190 (10th Cir. 1978)).  “[R]obbery, burglary and theft are 
ordinarily considered to be dishonest, but the term as used in Rule 609(a)(2) is more re-
stricted.”  Id.  We think the legislative history of this provision shows that Congress intended 
to limit the term to prior convictions involving some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or 
falsification which would tend to show that an accused would be likely to testify untruthful-
ly.”  Id. 
59 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) advisory committee‟s note (“The amendment requires that 
the proponent have ready proof that the conviction required the factfinder to find, or the 
defendant to admit, an act of dishonesty or false statement.  Ordinarily, the statutory 
elements of the crime will indicate whether it is one of dishonesty or false statement.  Where 
the deceitful nature of the crime is not apparent from the statute and the face of the 
judgment—as, for example, where the conviction simply records a finding of guilt for a 
statutory offense that does not reference deceit expressly—a proponent may offer 
information such as an indictment, a statement of admitted facts, or jury instructions to show 
that the factfinder had to find, or the defendant had to admit, an act of dishonesty or false 
statement in order for the witness to have been convicted.”). 
60 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) advisory committee‟s note (stating that, once the past 
conviction is shown to possess the required elements of either dishonest or false statement, it 
is admitted “regardless of punishment”).  Further, there is no provision in the rule 
distinguishing between use of 609(a)(2) in criminal or civil trials.  Id. 
61 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.”); United States v. Jefferson, 623 F.3d 227, 234 (5th Cir. 
2010) (stating that convictions for bribery constitute crimes of dishonesty); Cree v. Hatcher, 
969 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that “[u]nlike other crimes evidence of which is ad-
15
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issue of credibility, they are automatically admissible to impeach.62 
The second category of convictions is subdivision (a)(1) of 
Rule 609, which governs “other felony” convictions.63  The reference 
to “other felony” reflects that, unlike the convictions governed by 
Rule 609(a)(2), subdivision (a)(1) convictions have no elements of 
dishonesty, deceit, or false statement.64  When a criminal defendant 
testifies on his own behalf, his “other felony” convictions are subject 
to a type of “reverse 403” balancing test that presumes inadmissibili-
ty; in other words, the burden is on the prosecutor to show that the 
probative value of the conviction on the issue of the defendant‟s cre-
dibility outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.65 
The third category, the “other felony” convictions of all other 
witnesses—that is, defense and prosecution witnesses in criminal 
cases and witnesses in civil cases—are subject to the usual Rule 403 
principles that presume admissibility.66 
The last Rule 609 category, misdemeanors without an element 
of false statement or deceit, are inadmissible to impeach.67  Addition-
ally, mere arrests are inadmissible for impeachment purposes as 
well,68 although it should be noted that the conduct underlying an   
arrest may be the proper object of “bad” or “immoral act” impeach-
ment under Rule 608(b).69 
 
missible for the purpose of impeachment, evidence of crimes involving dishonesty or false 
statement is automatically admissible; the district court is without discretion to weigh the 
prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence against its probative value”). 
62 See sources cited supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
63 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., McDonald v. Hewitt, 196 F.R.D. 650, 652 (D. Utah 2000) (finding that a 
conviction of driving under the influence (a misdemeanor) was not admissible for 
impeachment by past conviction). 
68 See, e.g., Sanders-El v. Wencewicz, 987 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming a 
lower court decision that evidence of a witness‟s arrest was not admissible under the Federal 
Rules for impeachment purposes). 
69 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
        (b) Specific Instances of Conduct.  Except for a criminal convic-
tion under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specif-
ic instances of a witness‟s conduct in order to attack or support the wit-
ness‟s character for truthfulness.  But the court may, on cross-
examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: 
(1) the witness; or 
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-
16
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Rule 609(d) allows impeachment by conviction of juvenile 
delinquency adjudications only if “(1) it is offered in a criminal case; 
(2) the adjudication was of a witness other than the defendant; [and] 
(3) an adult‟s conviction for that offense would be admissible to at-
tack the adult‟s credibility; and (4) admitting the evidence is neces-
sary to fairly determine guilt or innocence.”70  In civil trials, delin-
quency adjudications are inadmissible for impeachment purposes.71 
Impeachment by conviction is a vital method, and the im-
peaching party may use extrinsic evidence, but only the record of 
conviction.  When a cross-examiner introduces evidence of a convic-
tion to impeach, the decisional law holds that he or she generally may 
show only the name of the crime, and the time and place of the con-
viction; sordid details are prohibited.72  Rule 609 additionally pre-
scribes that convictions more than ten years old are presumptively in-
admissible—that is, they may be introduced only if the court 
determines that the probative value of the conviction substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.73  “The ten-year time limit thus runs 
from the date of conviction or „the release of the witness from the 
confinement imposed for that conviction,‟ whichever is later,” but a 
period of parole or probation may not be considered confinement for 
the purpose of impeachment by conviction.74  Although pendency of 
an appeal from the conviction does not render evidence of the convic-
tion inadmissible to impeach, “[e]vidence of the pendency [of the ap-
 
examined has testified about. 
        By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privi-
lege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the wit-
ness‟s character for truthfulness. 
Id. 
70 FED. R. EVID. 609(d). 
71 See, e.g., Powell v. Levit, 640 F.2d 239, 241 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 845 
(1981) (finding that the lower court, in allowing in evidence regarding a witness‟s past 
convictions to impeach in a civil case, violated Rule 609(d), and that Congress specifically 
added “in a criminal case” when drafting the Rule). 
72 Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that unless the 
details of a crime bear directly on a witness‟s credibility, a cross-examiner “[cannot be] 
permitted to elicit the details of the crimes underlying [the witness‟s] conviction”). 
73 FED. R. EVID. 609(2)(b).  This Rule invokes a “Reverse 403”—that is, the introduction 
of evidence is presumed to be inadmissible unless the proponent can show that its probative 
value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.  Id. 
74 United States v. Rogers, 542 F.3d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting the language of 
Rule 609(2)(b) to determine both the calculation of the ten-year period and the fact that the 
text of 609(2)(b) makes no “mention of periods of probation or parole”). 
17
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peal] is also admissible.”75 
A party may introduce prior conviction evidence to impeach 
his or her own witness in an effort to “remove the sting” and avoid a 
potential assault on cross-examination.76  This direct examination tac-
tic, however, carries with it two potential consequences.  First, if a 
defendant testifies about his or her own past convictions on direct, he 
or she waives the right to challenge its admissibility on appeal.77  Ad-
ditionally, once a party testifies about his or her own conviction(s), it 
“opens the door” for opposing counsel to present further evidence re-
garding the conviction(s).78 
B. Impeachment by Collateral Methods 
1. Impeachment of a Witness by Evidence of 
Bad or Immoral Acts—You Can Ask, But 
That’s All You Can Do 
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) governs the introduction of 
evidence of a witness‟s prior “bad or immoral” acts for the purpose of 
impeachment.79  Author Shana Alexander in her book, The Pizza 
Connection,80 illustrates the use of this method of impeachment.  The 
Pizza Connection recounts the 1985 federal trial of twenty-two Mafia 
defendants accused of running a billion dollar drug-smuggling and 
money-laundering enterprise.  Nearly all of the defendants were in 
the pizza business.  At one point, defense attorney Lee Ginsberg fe-
 
75 FED. R. EVID. 609(e); see Wilson, 6 F.3d at 1237 (stating that, pursuant to Rule 
609(a)(1), a convicted criminal‟s conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes 
regardless of the fact that the conviction was pending appeal). 
76 Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757-58 (2000). 
77 Id. at 760 (concluding that “a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a 
prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such 
evidence was error”). 
78 See Ohler, 529 U.S. 753.  See also Gee v. Pride, 992 F.2d 159, 161 (8th Cir. 1993).  “At 
trial, [the defendant] testified on direct examination that he had previously been convicted of 
possession of a concealed weapon and that he was appealing three robbery convictions.”  Id. 
at 160.  On cross-examination, opposing counsel introduced evidence of the three 
convictions, which the trial court allowed.  Id. at 160-61.  On appeal, the Eight Circuit 
affirmed, holding that “[the defendant] „opened the door‟ to evidence regarding his prior 
robbery convictions by volunteering on direct examination that he was appealing the 
convictions,” as well as his concealed weapon conviction.  Id. at 161. 
79 See FED. R. EVID. 608. 
80 SHANA ALEXANDER, THE PIZZA CONNECTION (1988). 
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verishly grilled prosecution witness, Mafia turncoat Tomasso Buscet-
ta, on cross-examination about a history of less-than truthful beha-
viors including, lying to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
lying about his age, and lying about his residency status.  For each of 
these attacks on his moral character for truth-telling, he answered in 
the affirmative, admitting to having previously lied to authorities.  
Ginsberg then asked Mr. Buscetta if he lied when he said he “spoke 
only Spanish,” to which he defiantly answered, “si.”81  Buscetta, after 
having testified for several days, told Ginsberg, “I speak English to 
live, but not well enough to get along in this courtroom.”82 
Rule 608(b) sets forth the governing principles.  First, the 
conduct described under this rule did not result in a conviction; the 
rule plainly pertains to “specific instances of a witness‟s conduct.”83  
The conduct must be “probative of the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness . . . .”84  Rule 608 is subject to Rule 403; therefore, 
specific act evidence may be excluded if its “probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or need-
lessly presenting cumulative evidence.”85  Additionally, a witness 
may assert his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination when asked about the conduct that may incriminate 
him or her.86 
Because Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) other act evidence 
is a collateral method of impeachment, if the witness denies having 
engaged in the particular conduct extrinsic evidence may not be in-
troduced to prove that the witness in fact engaged in the conduct.87  
 
81 Id. at 65-66. 
82 Id. at 65-66, 68. 
83 See FED. R. EVID. 608 (emphasis added).  When the conduct did result in a conviction, 
the operative impeachment rule is FED. R. EVID. 609. 
84 Id.; see also United States v. Weeks, 611 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2010) (allowing 
testimony pertaining to a witness‟s use of false social security numbers because it “went to 
credibility and was therefore admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b)”). 
85 See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
86 FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee‟s note (“While it is 
clear that an ordinary witness cannot make a partial disclosure of incriminating matter and 
then invoke the privilege on cross-examination, no tenable contention can be made that 
merely by testifying he waives his right to foreclose inquiry on cross-examination into 
criminal activities for the purpose of attacking his credibility.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend 
V (stating that no person “shall be compelled . . . to be a witness against himself”). 
87 FED. R. EVID. 608; see, e.g., Deary v. City of Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191, 197 (1st Cir. 
1993) (“The purpose of the ban on extrinsic evidence is „to avoid holding mini-trials on 
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However, the cross examiner need not necessarily accept the wit-
ness‟s initial denial of the conduct.  In other words, the cross-
examiner may continue to press the witness to acknowledge commit-
ting the act until, of course, the judge determines that “enough is 
enough.”  The following example from the federal criminal prosecu-
tion of Senator Harrison A. Williams, illustrates this trial tactic of 
“pressing” the witness: 
Q: Mr. Weisberg, would you agree with me, yes or 
no[,] that you would describe yourself as having 
[spent] most of your life living by your wits end living 
off money you got from other people under false pre-
tenses; yes or no? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Would you also agree with me, sir, that a confi-
dence man such as yourself would lie, cheat, swindle 
whenever it serves your purpose to do so? 
A: That‟s not correct.88 
Upon Mr. Weisberg‟s denial, the cross-examiner pressed the 
witness who ultimately acknowledged that he previously testified 
“that a confidence man would lie, cheat, swindle, whenever it serves 
his purpose to do so.”89  Unless the court determines that the cross-
examiner‟s repeated probing violates that tenets of Rule 403, the 
cross-examiner may continue to attempt to “wear down” a witness in 
an effort to elicit an affirmative response. 
2. Impeachment by Evidence of Bad Reputation 
for Truthfulness 
In the highly-celebrated case of State v. Von Bulow,90 defen-
dant Clause von Bulow was on trial for the attempted murder of his 
 
irrelevant or collateral matters‟ ” (quoting United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 3 n.1 
(1st Cir. 1993))). 
88 IRVING YOUNGER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 317 (3rd ed. 1997).  In the 
prosecution of United States Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., for “conspiracy, bribery, 
receipt of unlawful gratuities, and conflict of interest,” key government witness Melvin 
Weisberg, a co-operating government witness, was grilled by defense counsel on cross 
concerning his prior acts pertaining to truthfulness.  Id. at 317-18. 
89 Id. at 318. 
90 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984). 
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heiress wife, Martha.91  The prosecution alleged that Clause injected 
Martha with insulin, causing a coma and, eventually, her death.92  In 
an attempt to damage the prosecution‟s theory, the defense called Joy 
O‟Neill, one of Martha‟s fitness instructors to testify that after Joy 
complained to Martha about her weight problem, Martha suggested 
Joy take a shot of insulin.  Martha explained that insulin consumed 
sugar in one‟s system.  The prosecution then called Nancy Raether, a 
rather pleasant, intellectual and poised woman.  After testifying that 
she knew O‟Neill, when asked about O‟Neill‟s reputation for truth-
fulness, Ms. Raether “lowered her head and said softly, „I‟m afraid it 
wasn‟t very good.‟ ”93 
An examining attorney may introduce evidence to show a 
witness‟s bad character for truth and veracity, pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 608(a).94  We have placed this method of im-
peachment in the collateral category, mainly for convenience in orga-
nizing the material pertaining to the various impeachment methods.  
In fact this is the only impeachment method that requires the im-
peaching party to call a second witness.  In order to impeach a wit-
ness‟s credibility under this method, the attorney must call a second 
“character” witness, who may testify in the form of either an opinion 
or reputation of the prime witness‟s character for truth or veracity.95  
Evidence of specific conduct of the prime witness is not permissible 
for this purpose.  Prior to the introduction of either opinion or reputa-
tion testimony, the examining attorney must lay a proper foundation 
 
91 Id. at 999. 
92 Id. 
93 WILLIAM WRIGHT, THE VON BULOW AFFAIR 305 (1983); see also REVERSAL OF 
FORTUNE (Sovereign Films 1990). 
94 FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
A witness‟s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about 
the witness‟s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or un-
truthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that charac-
ter.  But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the wit-
ness‟s character for truthfulness has been attacked. 
Id. 
95 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 405(a). 
When evidence of a person‟s character or character trait is admissible, it 
may be proved by testimony about the person‟s reputation or by testimo-
ny in the form of an opinion.  On cross-examination of the character wit-
ness, the court may allow an inquiry into relevant specific instances of 
the person‟s conduct. 
Id. 
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establishing that the character witness knows the prime witness to the 
extent that the character witness is in a position to know either the 
prime witness‟s reputation or to offer an opinion.96  For matters of 
reputation evidence, the attorney must first establish that the charac-
ter witness belongs to the same community as the prime witness in 
order for the character witness to readily know the “bad” reputation 
at issue.97  The “community” at issue must be “sufficiently numer-
ous” to comprise a community for the purpose of this impeachment 
method98 and must include both the prime and character witnesses as 
members.99  For example, the community may consist of the area in 
which they reside, work, or attend school. 
Once the examining attorney establishes that the character 
witness both knows the primary witness and belongs to the same 
community as the primary witness, the examining attorney may in-
quire about the reputation or opinion of the primary witness.100  Rule 
405(a), which governs the admissibility of character evidence, limits 
questions about reputation or opinion on direct examination, but on 
cross-examination, an attorney may inquire into relevant instances of 
the prime witness‟s conduct.101  The rationale is that if the character 
witness does not know about these specific acts, she may not be in a 
position to testify about the prime witness‟s reputation or offer an 
opinion.  On the other hand, if she acknowledges the specific acts, 
 
96 See Wilson, 6 F.3d at 1239 (holding that a journalist‟s opinion testimony regarding a 
witness‟s character for untruthfulness to be relevant because the journalist spent a great deal 
of time with the witness and became accustomed to his lack of veracity). 
97 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478 (1948) (“[This testimony] is 
accepted only from a witness whose knowledge of defendant‟s habitat and surroundings is 
intimate enough so that his failure to hear of any relevant ill repute is an assurance that no 
ugly rumors were about.”). 
98 People v. Fernandez, 950 N.E.2d 126, 127-28 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that the County 
Court erred when it precluded reputation testimony by finding that an extended family was 
not large enough to be considered a community). 
99 See United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135, 1140 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that “[the 
character witness] probably was not a member of the communities in which [the primary 
witness] lived or worked and it is unclear whether his categorical answer „poor,‟ based on 
interviews of [twelve] members of those communities, referred to [the primary witness‟s] 
community reputation or to his reputation with the particular individuals interviewed”); see 
also Maine v. Ricker, 770 A.2d 1021, 1024 (Me. 2001) (noting that the “community must be 
sufficiently numerous for the opinion of reputation to be reliable”); People v. Bouton, 405 
N.E.2d 699, 704 (N.Y. 1980) (“A reputation may grow wherever an individual‟s associations 
are of such quantity and quality as to permit him to be personally observed by a sufficient 
number of individuals to give reasonable assurance of reliability.”). 
100 FED. R. EVID. 405(a). 
101 Id. 
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there may be a question about the accuracy of her opinion as to the 
character witness‟s reputation.   
We reemphasize that while the authors have placed this me-
thod of impeachment in the collateral category, in fact it is not impor-
tant where it is placed.  The impeachment method requires a specific 
method of proof, namely testimony, of a character witness who testi-
fies in the form of reputation or opinion. 
a. In New York, It’s All About 
Reputation: Keep Your Opinions to 
Yourself 
The rule of evidence in New York State regarding impeach-
ment by evidence of character differs from the federal rule in that 
New York courts allow the introduction only of reputation evi-
dence.102  Much like the federal rules, the New York rule allows a 
character witness who “resides, moves, circulates or does business 
within the natural radius of repute of the witness who has previously 
testified” to proffer evidence of bad reputation.103  However, unlike 
the federal rules, the New York rule prohibits testimony of the wit-
ness‟s opinion and limits the character witness to testify solely on the 
primary witness‟s bad reputation for veracity within a particular 
community.104 
C. Hybrid Methods 
1. Impeachment by Showing a Prior 
Inconsistent Statement 
Few Hollywood courtroom classics have been able to match 
the intensity of the scene in the 1957 classic, Witness for the Prosecu-
tion,105 in which Leonard Vole, played by Tyrone Power, is prosecut-
 
102 See GARY SHAW, CANUDO ON EVIDENCE LAWS OF NEW YORK 154-55 (2010). 
103 Id. at 155. 
104 See People v. Hanley, 833 N.E.2d 248, 250 (N.Y. 2005) (“The trial court must allow 
[reputation] testimony, once a foundation has been laid, so long as it is relevant to contradict 
the testimony of a key witness and is limited to general reputation for truth and veracity in 
the community.”). 
105 WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION (MGM Studios 1957). 
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ed for the murder of a wealthy widow, Emily French.106  Defense at-
torney Sir Wilfred Roberts, played by Charles Laughton, impeaches 
the beautiful, but sinister Christine Helm Vole, memorably played by 
screen legend Marlene Dietrich.  In the film, Christine testified that 
her husband, Leonard Vole, after returning home on the night of the 
murder with blood on his clothes, confessed to murdering the victim.  
A letter that Christine wrote to her lover that evening, which stated 
that she planned to lie on the witness stand in order to send her hus-
band to prison and to be free of playing the part of a loving, grateful 
wife, came into defense counsel Sir Wilfred‟s possession.107  The 
next day, upon re-calling Christine to the stand, he read the letter 
aloud into the record, forcing Christine, with an icy stare, to admit 
writing it.  Finally, Vole went free. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 613 covers prior inconsistent state-
ments of witnesses for purposes of impeachment.108  Oral as well as 
written inconsistent statements, or even silence, may be admissible, 
provided the out-of court statement in some way contradicts the wit-
ness‟s in-court testimony.109  A testifying witness‟s out-of-court in-
consistent statement is not hearsay when offered solely to impeach, 
because the out-of-court statement is not being offered for its truth, 
but only to prove that the inconsistent statement was made.110  The 
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 FED. R. EVID. 613. 
(a) Showing or Disclosing the Statement During Examination.  When 
examining a witness about the witness‟s prior statement, a party need not 
show it or disclose its contents to the witness.  But the party must, on re-
quest, show it or disclose its contents to an adverse party‟s attorney. 
(b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement.  Extrinsic 
evidence of a witness‟s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if 
the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and 
an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, 
or if justice so requires.  This subdivision (b) does not apply to an oppos-
ing party‟s statement under Rule 801(d)(2). 
Id. 
109 See FED. R. EVID. 613 advisory committee‟s note; see also United States v. DeSimone, 
488 F.3d 561, 572 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Although „statements need not be directly contradictory 
in order to be deemed inconsistent within the purview of Rule 613(b),‟ . . . the decision 
whether an inconsistency exists „lies within the sound discretion of the district court.‟ ” 
(quoting Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2001))). 
110 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“ „Hearsay‟ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does 
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”); see also, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) 
(“The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the 
24
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mere making of the inconsistent statement, apart from its truth or fal-
sity, bears relevance to the credibility of the witness‟s testimony.  An 
inconsistent statement introduced for the sole purpose of impeach-
ment should be followed by limiting instructions to the jury that the 
statement was introduced not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, 
but solely for the mere fact that it was formerly made by the witness 
in order to assess his or her credibility.111 
Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may be either a 
collateral or vital method, depending on whether it relates to an im-
portant or tangential fact in the case.112  Rule 613 explicitly prescribes 
that once extrinsic evidence of the inconsistent statement is intro-
duced, the witness must be “afforded an opportunity to explain or de-
ny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to inter-
rogate [the witness] thereon . . . .”113  Whether the witness‟s 
opportunity to explain or mitigate the inconsistency occurs prior to 
the introduction of the statement or after, or whether the opportunity 
is provided on cross-examination or redirect examination, is irrele-
vant; the rule simply prescribes that the witness must be afforded the 
opportunity at some point to explain or deny the inconsistent state-
ment.114   
The Advisory Committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 
613(a) refers to the common law rule established by The Queens 
Case, also referred to as the case of Queen Caroline, that a witness 
 
statement: (A) is inconsistent with the declarant‟s testimony and was given under penalty of 
perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; (B) is consistent with the 
declarant‟s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant 
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.”). 
111 See FED. R. EVID. 105 (“If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party 
or for a purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely 
request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
112 See United States v. Int‟l Bus. Machines Corp., 432 F. Supp. 138, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) (noting that Rule 613 does not explicitly prohibit the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence, but, according to 613(b), “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a witness‟s prior inconsistent 
statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the 
statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if 
justice so requires”). 
113 Id. at n.7; see also United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 955 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting 
the advisory committee‟s note to Rule 613(b), “ „the traditional insistence that the attention 
of the witness be directed to the statement on cross[-]examination is relaxed in favor of 
simply providing the witness an opportunity to explain and the opposite party an opportunity 
to examine the statement, with no specification of any particular time or sequence . . . .‟ ”). 
114 Hudson, 970 F.2d at 955. 
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first be shown a written inconsistent statement before being cross-
examined about it.
115
  The case was a scandalous divorce proceeding 
brought by King George IV of Wales and Queen Caroline.  The King 
had many love affairs and drank heavily, while the Queen had her 
own sexual affairs.  One individual described her as a “sensual wan-
derer.”116  Federal Rule of Evidence 613 (a) abolished the English 
common law rule that required the cross-examiner first to show the 
witness a written inconsistent statement, or tell the witness about the 
time, place, and circumstance of an oral inconsistent statement, be-
fore questioning the witness about the statement.  According to the 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 613, Rule 613 “abolishes this use-
less impediment to cross-examination.  Both oral and written state-
ments are included.”117  
The example provided from Witness for the Prosecution pro-
vides a dramatic cinematic turn of events.  In the film, the cross-
examining defense attorney offered the letter written by Christine not 
only for the purpose of discrediting her prior statement, but also for 
the truth of the letter‟s contents.118  Christine not only lied on the wit-
ness stand, but the words contained within the letter to her lover stat-
ing that she would lie served to free the defendant.  It may be as-
sumed that the jurisdiction in which the diabolical Christine was 
subject to cross-examination allowed introduction of evidence of 
prior inconsistent statements for their truth.  Under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), a witness‟s prior inconsistent statement is ex-
empt from the rule against hearsay if the inconsistent statement was 
made under oath at some type of judicial or quasi-judicial proceed-
ing, or deposition.119  Note that Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not require 
 
115 The Queen‟s Case, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820). 
116
See Marcelle Mouledoux, The Divorce Trial of Queen Caroline: Contemporary 
Responses and Social Attitudes,  http://www.loyno.edu/history/journal/mouledoux.htm.   
117
FED. R. EVID. 613 advisory committee‟s note. 
118 WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION, supra note 105. 
119 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness‟s Prior Statement.  The declarant testifies and is 
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant‟s testimony and was giv-
en under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceed-
ing or in a deposition. 
Id. 
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that there be a right of cross-examination at the proceeding.120  As a 
result, a witness‟s inconsistent statement made during grand jury tes-
timony is exempt from the rule against hearsay and thus admissible 
both for impeachment purposes and for its truth. 
2. Impeachment by Contradiction 
During his direct examination [in United States v Gilmore,121 
the criminal defendant] and his attorney had the following ex-
change: 
Q: After you were indicted in this case, you got a chance to 
go through the evidence? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: That they had against you to show that you were a drug 
dealer, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And we went through that evidence, didn‟t we? 
A: Yes, we did. 
Q: And you see any evidence in this case that you‟re a drug 
dealer, sir? 
A: No, I didn‟t sell no drugs.  I never did. 
        Before beginning its cross-examination, the Gov-
ernment advised the District Court that it intended to 
ask [the defendant] about two prior felony drug distri-
bution convictions in order to contradict his sworn 
statement that he never sold drugs.  [The defendant] 
objected.  The District Court overruled the objection, 
stating that it was “going to permit the government to 
cross examine [the defendant] on that conviction, to 
contradict his statement that he‟s never sold drugs.”  
The District Court, however, would not allow the 
Government to offer the certified judgments into evi-
dence unless Gilmore denied the convictions.  The 
District Court also informed the parties that it would 
 
120 Id. (referring to “a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition . . . .”). 
121 553 F.3d 266, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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issue a limiting instruction to the jury to use the con-
victions only for credibility purposes and not as evi-
dence of guilt. 
        Pursuant to the District Court‟s ruling, the Gov-
ernment cross-examined Gilmore about his prior drug 
convictions: 
Q: Mr. Gilmore, you testified on direct that you never 
sold drugs, correct? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: Isn‟t it a fact, Mr. Gilmore, that you were con-
victed here in the Superior Court of Camden County 
on May 22nd, 1992 of possession with intent to distri-
bute [controlled dangerous substances]?  And posses-
sion of [controlled dangerous substances] with intent 
to distribute within a thousand feet of a school? 
A: That was a long time ago. 
Q: But you were convicted of selling drugs? 
A: Yes, I was, a long time ago, and I changed my life 
around when I got out.122 
Although not expressly set forth in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, federal courts permit the use of specific contradiction for the 
purposes of impeachment.123  Under this method of impeachment, the 
cross-examiner attempts to show that a fact or facts testified to on di-
rect is inaccurate, making all or part of the witness‟s direct testimony 
not believable.  Some federal courts, in determining whether to allow 
specific contradiction evidence, apply Federal Rule of Evidence 
403,124 while others allow extrinsic evidence of impeachment by con-
 
122 Id. at 269-70 (footnote omitted). 
123 See, e.g., id.; see also Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1456-57 (10th Cir. 
1997). 
124 See, e.g., United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2009) (stat-
ing that “when making the decision whether to permit impeachment by contradiction, trial 
courts should consider the Rule 403 factors, such as confusion of the jury or the cumulative 
nature of the evidence”); see also United States v. Gilmore, 553 F.3d 266, 271 (2009) (stat-
ing that “the Government may impeach a defendant‟s testimony with contradictory evidence 
unless the „probative value [of the evidence] is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of un-
due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.‟ ” (alterations in 
the original)). 
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tradiction on non-collateral, or vital matters only—that is, the courts 
will allow it if “ „the matter itself is . . . relevant in the litigation to es-
tablish a fact of consequence, i.e., . . . relevant for a purpose other 
than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness.‟ ”125  
Further, because evidence of specific contradiction is not provided 
for in the federal rules, the evidence must “satisf[y] the Rule 403 ba-
lancing test and is not barred by any other rule of evidence.”126  It is 
unlikely that the application of one of these methods rather than 
another will lead to a different result because if the issue is tangential 
or collateral, the probative value of the extrinsic evidence is likely to 
be quite low, leading to exclusion under Rule 403.  Essentially, 
“[i]mpeachment by contradiction is a means of „policing the defen-
dant‟s obligation to speak the truth in response to proper              
questions.‟ ”127 
IV. IN TYPICAL HOLLYWOOD STYLE . . . THE END 
Impeachment plays a vital role in so many trials.  Because 
impeachment presents numerous possibilities for high drama scena-
rios and sometimes even a few laughs, Hollywood screenwriters and 
crime fiction novelists have come to employ impeachment methods 
throughout film scenes and book excerpts, both fiction and non-
fiction.  Crime reporters for high-profile trials anxiously await possi-
ble page-turning real-life dramas in which witnesses are attacked by 
keen defense attorneys.  Moviegoers‟ eyes remained glued to the 
screen when Marlene Dietrich, as the femme fatale Christine in Wit-
ness for the Prosecution, admitted her malicious lies.  Avid crime 
drama enthusiasts have turned the pages awaiting trial scenes in 
James Patterson novels in which the cross-examiner nabs the perjur-
er.  And no one alive in the 1990‟s can forget the furor over discover-
ing Detective Mark Fuhrman‟s racist tendencies during the notorious 
O.J. Simpson murder trial.  These tactics were seen and witnessed by 
millions, and they were all examples of impeachment. 
Law students, law professors, and legal practitioners take    
notice.  The study of the rules of impeachment is not simply limited 
 
125 Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 4. 
126 Id. 
127 Gilmore, 553 F.3d at 271 (quoting United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 
2007)). 
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to the Federal or State evidence rule volumes, or judicial decisional 
law.  The rules spell out the recurring evidentiary principles for pur-
poses of trial practice.  The cases in reported decisions amplify the 
meaning of the rules, fill in the details, and apply the rules on an on-
going basis.  However, we must not overlook that there exists another 
resource, one that is also right within our reach.  The next time you 
purchase a movie ticket, pick up the remote control, begin flipping 
through the pages of a great crime novel, or peruse the newspaper, 
remain aware of the evidentiary educational possibilities that lie with-
in the realm of entertainment. 
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